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1.  Mental properties as determinables 
2.  Mental properties as disjunctive properties 
 
ABSTRACT. If we accept causal exclusion, property dualism and 
physical determinism, mental epiphenomenalism follows. Accord-
ing to Yablo (1992), we can save mental causation by rejecting 
causal exclusion and considering the mental/physical relation as an 
instance of the determinable/determinate relation. In this paper I ex-
amine Crane’s argument (2008) against the causal relevance of de-
terminables, and I argue that we still have good reasons to think that 
determinables may be causally efficacious. As mental properties can 
be also considered as exhaustive disjunctions of physical realizers, 
the causal relevance of mental properties is also questioned by the 
widely shared opinion that disjunctive properties can not be causally 
efficacious. I consider Clapp’s arguments (2001) in favor of the 
causal relevance of disjunctive properties, and I conclude that dis-
junctive properties may survive both Armstrong’s famous objections 
(1978).   
 
 
Jaegwon Kim (1998) has famously developed the Supervenience Argu-
ment, aimed to prove that, under the hypothesis of non-reducibility of the 
mental to the physical, the unintelligibility of mental causation follows. So, 
according to Kim, what we have is a definite choice: reductionism, or mental 
epiphenomenalism. The Supervenience Argument makes a crucial use of two 






Stephen Yablo (1992) has proposed a similar argument for the epiphenom-
enalism of mental properties: 
 
1. Exclusion: if a property X is causally sufficient for an event y, then no 
property X* distinct from X is causally relevant to y; 
2. Physical Determinism: for every physical event y, some physical proper-
ty X is causally sufficient for y; 
3. Dualism: for every physical property P and every mental property M, P 
is distinct from M. 
 
If we hold 1, 2 and 3, mental epiphenomenalism follows. Which premise 
might we reject in order to avoid epiphenomenalism? Obviously not 2. Not 1: 
“properties are identical only if one necessitates the other; but any physical 
property specific enough to necessitate a mental property is inevitably so spe-
cific that the converse necessitation fails” (Yablo 1992, p. 250). Might we 
find a way to reject 3? 
 
 
1.  Mental properties as determinables 
 
Yablo suggests to look for an explanation of the asymmetric necessitation pic-
ture that automatically defuses the exclusion principle: the relation determi-
nate-determinable. If mental properties are determinables of physical proper-
ties, there is no causal exclusion, and no epiphenomenalism. Yablo just re-
quires the necessitation relation to be thought as metaphysical, not conceptual; 
and the supervenience relation between M and P not to be thought as emer-
gence. 
But what are Yablo’s arguments for claiming that a determinate can not 
preempt its own determinable? His first argument is intuition. Take a building 
collapsed because of a violent earthquake. It is absurd to claim that the cause 
of its collapsing was the bare violence of the earthquake, and that by the ex-
clusion principle its being violent made no causal difference. His second ar-
gument is counterfactual reasoning. Suppose that Socrates guzzled the hem-
lock and died. His guzzling (determinate) does not cause his death; his drink-
ing (determinable) does. In fact, if Socrates had not guzzled the hemlock (if 
he had drunk it without guzzling it), he would have died; if he had not drunk 
it, he would not have died. Yablo’s third argument is rampant epiphenomenal-
ism. If only super-determinates are causally efficacious, then – as a large ma-





jority of properties are amenable to further determination – the large majority 
of properties turn to be epiphenomenal. 
Tim Crane (2008) has sustained that Yablo’s proposal can be easily reject-
ed. Crane’s argument for the thesis that only super-determinates are causally 
efficacious goes like this: 
 
1. Some predicates refer to no property (even if properties are necessarily 
existent). Crane’s example is the predicate “is red or white”, which is true of a 
red wine just in virtue of the wine’s being red. 
2. When a predication is true, it is the instantiation of a property which 
makes it true. Or (a weaker thesis), if a predication has a truthmaker, its 
truthmaker is the instantiation of a property. 
3. Causation is relational, and its relata are properties. 
4. If a causal truth has a truthmaker, this truthmaker must be itself relation-
al. 
5. The relata of the causal relation will then be the truthmakers for the re-
lata of the causal truth. 
6. Causation, then, is a relation between truthmakers. 
7. If we call sparse properties those properties whose instantiations can be 
truthmakers (2), the relata of the causal relation are sparse properties. 
8. Only super-determinates are sparse, because only super-determinates are 
truthmakers. E.g., it is my being exactly 185cm tall that makes it true that “I 
am tall” or “I am over 180cm”. 
9. Only super-determinates are causally efficacious. 
 
Crane says that Yablo’s first argument, focused on intuition, actually is based 
on counterfactual considerations; therefore it is sufficient to reject his second 
argument to reject both. According to Crane, the truth of the counterfactual “If 
Socrates had not drunk it, he would not have died” is not evidence of the 
causal efficacy of the determinable mentioned on it. When we predicate a de-
terminable property of an object, we just specify that the object has a sparse 
property within some range. The relevant effect is counterfactually dependent 
on the instantiation of a super-determinate property within the relevant range. 
Therefore our commitment to the Socrates counterfactual is consistent with 
the truth that only super-determinates are causally efficacious. As for Yablo’s 
third argument, Crane objects that there is nothing absurd in the idea that most 






Two points in favor of Yablo’s position seem to survive Crane’s defence 
of epiphenomenalism. First, as every property seem amenable to further de-
termination, may be there are not super-determinates after all (no bottom lev-
el). Second, may be that super-determinates (if any) incorporate too many 
causally irrelevant details. As Yablo (1992, pp. 258-259) points out, adding 
determination means adding details; not every aspect in a cause contributes to 
its effect; if some determinables are more causally relevant than their super-




2.  Mental properties as disjunctive properties 
 
It is obvious that, if only super-determinates are causally efficacious, then dis-
junctive properties are not. Determinables can be seen as exhaustive disjunc-
tions of determinates: so, if disjunctive properties are not causally efficacious, 
then determinables are not. Determinables and disjunctive properties seem to 
stand or fall together. Moreover, mental properties and disjunctive properties 
seem to stand or fall together. In fact, if mental properties are multiply realiz-
able by physical properties, and if they supervene on physical properties, they 
can be seen as exhaustive disjunctions of physical properties. 
In the debate about mental reduction, many philosophers thought that mul-
tiple realizability would award the victory to nonreductive physicalism. After 
all, if MP1P2P3…Pn, M cannot be reduced to any Pi. Reductionists 
adopted the disjunctive strategy: M can be reduced to P1P2P3…Pn. 
Fodor (1974) made the move for the antireductionist party: M is not reduced 
to P1P2P3…Pn, since M is a natural kind, while P1P2P3…Pn is not 
– it is wildly disjunctive. Kim objected that being described in a different way 
can not change things: either both M and P1P2P3…Pn are kinds, or none 
is. And as P1P2P3…Pn is wildly disjunctive – that is, it is causally heter-
ogeneous, due to each Pi having different causal powers from every other Pi’ – 
then M is not a kind. 
Andy Clapp (2001) claimed that Kim is right in asking that either both M 
and P1P2P3…Pn are kinds, or none is. But, according to him, Kim is 
wrong in arguing that a disjunctive property can not be a kind. What we 
would have in following Kim is rampant illegitimacy (not just rampant epi-
phenomenalism): as most if not all properties are multiply realizable, or high-
order, then most if not all properties would be illegitimate. 





Clapp claims that not every disjunctive predicate designates a disjunctive 
property. A disjunctive predicate π1π2π3…πn is a properly disjunctive 
predicate if and only if: (1) there is more than one πi; (2) each πi designates a 
legitimate property; (3) each πi designates a distinct property. P is a disjunc-
tive property if and only if P can be designated by a properly disjunctive pred-
icate. In order to avoid rampant illegitimacy, at least some disjunctive proper-
ties must survive Armstrong’s two arguments against disjunctive properties. 
Armstrong’s first argument is: 
Disjunctive properties offend against the principle that a genuine prop-
erty is identical in its different particulars. Suppose a has a property P, 
but lacks Q while b has Q but lacks P. It seems laughable to conclude 
from these premises that a and b are identical in some respect. Yet both 
have the “property” PQ (Armstrong 1978, p. 20). 
Clapp admits that the argument is effective for the predicate “is a raven or a 
writing desk”, and similar. But consider the (perhaps infinite) disjunctive 
predicate χ1χ2χ3…χn where each χi designates a distinct color property Ci 
and every color is designated by some χi. It is a properly disjunctive predicate; 
then, if it designates a property, it designates a disjunctive property. But it 
does designate a property: the determinable being colored is the designated 
disjunctive property. It seems that all the disjuncts share a property; they over-
lap on a property. Clapp’s claim is that the same is true of P1P2P3…Pn: 
the disjuncts overlap on the property M. 
But there is another obvious difficulty. Here is Armstrong’s second argument: 
The postulation of disjunctive properties breaks the link which it is nat-
ural to make between properties of things and causal powers of things. 
Suppose that a has P but lacks Q. The predicate ‘PQ’ applies to a. 
Nevertheless, when a acts, it will surely act only in virtue of its being P. 
Its being PQ will add no power to its arm. This suggests that being 
PQ is not a property (Armstrong 1978, p. 20). 
Clapp answers that what Armstrong is reasonably requiring is that a predicate 
π designates a property P if and only if there is a nonempty set of causal pow-
ers p such that: (a) if a particular o satisfies π, then o possesses every power in 
p; and the converse: (b) if a particular o possesses every power in p, then o 
satisfies π. There is no such a nonempty set of causal powers p for the predi-





consider the intersection c1c2c3…cn of all the causal powers constitut-
ing the properties designated by the disjuncts, we have that it meets condition 
(a): if o satisfies χ1χ2χ3…χn, o possesses all the causal powers ci consti-
tuting some Ci, then it possesses all the causal powers in c1c2c3…cn. 
And c1c2c3…cn also meets condition (b). Let us stipulate that P realiz-
es Q if and only if qp. A determinate realizes a determinable, then the set of 
the causal powers of the determinable is a proper subset of the set of the caus-
al powers of the determinate. A multiply realized property is constituted by 
the intersection of the sets of the causal powers constituting its realizers. 
c1c2c3…cn constitutes being colored. Every object o instantiating 
c1c2c3…cn instantiates being colored, then it has some color, then it 
satisfies some χi, then it satisfies χ1χ2χ3…χn. 
Also P1P2P3…Pn, that is M, satisfies both (a) and (b). There are caus-
ally efficacious, legitimate disjunctive properties, and M is one of them. M is 
not epiphenomenal: it is constituted by the intersection of the sets of the caus-
al powers of all its physical realizers, p1p2p3…pn. There is no need for 
the causal powers of M to be new, or emerging, or not inherited from its real-
izers. The causal overdetermination problem disappears: as there is no deter-
minable/determinate tension, there is no realized/realizer tension. M is a legit-
imate property that can figure in laws (this guarantees, as it seems, the auton-
omy of social sciences). We may deny all this: but the price of doing so would 
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